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Preface 
This report examines the literature on labor inspection in developing countries in order to 
learn how human resource practices in labor enforcement agencies influence the performance of 
labor inspectorates in developing countries. As a supplement to a substantial literature about the 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative labor law regimes and the effectiveness of 
alternative inspection strategies, this review highlights the state of knowledge about the 
conditions, competencies, and incentives needed for labor inspectors in developing countries to 
successfully carry out their work. This report focuses on two relatively narrow questions: What 
qualifications and personal characteristics are necessary for individual labor inspectors in 
developing countries to perform their jobs well, and what human resource policies are important 
for creating an inspectorate with the necessary skills to function effectively? The research 
reported here was sponsored by the Bureau of International Labor Affairs of the U.S. Department 
of Labor. 
This research was undertaken within RAND Labor and Population. RAND Labor and 
Population has built an international reputation for conducting objective, high-quality, empirical 
research to support and improve policies and organizations around the world. Its work focuses on 
children and families, demographic behavior, education and training, labor markets, social-
welfare policy, immigration, international development, financial decisionmaking, and issues 
related to aging and retirement with a common aim of understanding how policy and social and 
economic forces affect individual decisionmaking and human well-being. 
For more information on RAND Labor and Population, see http://www.rand.org/labor.html 
or contact the director (contact information is on the web page). 
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Introduction 
As part of its mission to improve treatment and benefits for workers around the world, the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) aims to help 
governments design more-effective means for labor rights compliance. An important means for 
achieving labor rights compliance is an effective labor inspection system. The objective of this 
report is to help identify the conditions, competencies, and incentives needed for labor 
inspectors, especially those in developing countries, to successfully carry out their work. Its 
focus is limited to what one might call the human resource (HR) issues affecting inspector 
effectiveness in those countries. ILAB asked RAND for a review of the relevant scientific 
literature examining the effects that HR practices can have on the effectiveness of labor 
inspectorates in developing countries. 
This report focuses on two related, relatively narrow questions: What qualifications and 
personal characteristics are necessary for individual labor inspectors to perform their jobs well, 
and what HR policies are important for creating an inspectorate with the necessary skills to 
function effectively? Some examples of HR topics that fall within the scope of these questions 
are educational requirements, recruitment practices, training, compensation, and work 
environment. Because the success of a labor inspectorate depends on a wide range of factors 
apart from HR practices, it is important to demarcate the scope of this review clearly. We do not 
address the effectiveness of different labor law regimes. Similarly, we deemed research on 
tactics and strategies for carrying out inspections to be beyond the scope of our study. We do 
discuss several studies that discuss HR issues, such as educational and training prerequisites or 
inspector morale, in the context of these broader questions about what standards labor law sets 
and what enforcement actions inspectors take. Otherwise, we refrain from discussing the more-
substantial literature on these broader questions. 
Although we defined HR practices narrowly, we admitted studies covering enforcement of 
any type of labor standards, including occupational safety and health (OSH), minimum wages 
and overtime rules, and child labor restrictions. This report contains only a review of the 
published literature and does not present any original analysis. The initial focus of the search was 
on peer-reviewed journals; however, given the paucity of that literature, we also reviewed the 
reports produced by the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
We found that very few academic studies have taken an empirical approach to testing 
hypotheses about the impact of HR policies on inspector effectiveness. Of the few studies that 
include empirical analysis, most examined inspectors in developed countries. To supplement the 
limited literature, we also discuss what the ILO and other authorities say about best practices for 
these human resources and provide some evidence about actual practices. 
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Methods 
To find relevant academic studies on labor inspectorate practices in developing countries, we 
conducted an online search of academic databases (e.g., Scopus, Web of Science, EconLit), 
including studies in English and Spanish published after 1992. We used key terms that aligned 
with three categories of factors that could affect inspector performance: 
• individual characteristics of inspectors (e.g., education, job-relevant abilities, belief in the 
mission of the agency) 
• HR policies and practices (e.g., entry requirements and selection, training, performance 
measurement) 
• other factors that could interact with the effectiveness of HR practices for labor 
inspectorates (e.g., amount of discretion given to inspectors, size of informal sector, 
national culture, legitimacy of government). 
Our searches combined one or more of key terms from the three categories and one or more 
terms related to inspection. See the appendix for the databases and search terms we used to find 
articles. 
Our initial search yielded 1,305 articles. One team member (first reader) eliminated 1,089 of 
these as having no relevance to labor inspections. Of the 216 potentially relevant articles 
remaining, the first reader and a second reader eliminated 167 that they judged to be 
uninformative about HR practices after reading the abstract, introduction, and conclusion. This 
left us with 35 relevant articles on labor inspections (as well as 14 others on other types of 
inspectors). The first reader coded these articles by subject using a list of nonexclusive 
classifications based on the three main categories. See the appendix for the full list of 
classifications and associated number of articles. 
However, further review by the second reader along with a third reader determined that many 
of these articles were from developed-country settings or did not address any of the HR issues 
identified in our work plan. We kept articles from developed-country settings only if they 
explicitly focused on HR issues. Similarly, we excluded many of the articles about developing 
countries either because they did not address HR issues at all or because the treatment was 
descriptive and thin. We ended up using 15 studies from the database searches described in the 
appendix, 22 sources from the ILO, and six from other sources. 
In addition to this literature review, we searched the documents in the ILO publication 
database (Labordoc), using “labor inspection” and related terms for the search. (Many of the ILO 
reports and studies do not appear in the standard databases.) Among other things, we searched 
for documents that could provide a structured description and comparison of HR practices in 
different countries. The closest category we found was the ILO country profiles, which, for each 
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of the selected countries, provided one or two pages of material on HR issues. Table 1 in the next 
section includes information from the recent studies that we found. 
Lastly, we selectively reviewed studies from the pre-1993 period, almost all of which 
concerned labor or environmental regulation in developed countries. Despite that focus, we think 
that some of the insights there could have broader applicability. 
Findings 
In this section, we review the main HR topics addressed by our review. We begin each 
subsection by discussing any guidance that the ILO has provided about best practices in HR. We 
then use the ILO reports and academic studies to describe how developing countries actually 
organize their labor inspectorates and what shortcomings are apparent. 
The topics we discuss are as follows: 
• entry requirements for new labor inspectors (entry requirements and training are linked to 
issues of generalist versus specialized inspectors) 
• initial and ongoing training 
• turnover, staffing levels, and work conditions 
• measuring and incentivizing labor inspector performance 
• inspectorate culture and ethical behavior 
• relationship between enforcement strategies and HR issues. 
Entry Requirements for New Labor Inspectors 
Although the academic literature provides little information on how inspectorates in 
developing countries recruit and select new labor inspectors, reports from the ILO discuss entry 
requirements that labor inspectorates seek or should seek from new inspectors. For example, the 
ILO reports that requirements for a college degree are in place in some developing countries, as 
Table 1 indicates. Mexico (Bensusán, 2009), Costa Rica (Ruiz, 2009), and Uganda 
(Abongomera, 2006) also appear to require college degrees, at least for new hires. Scientific 
education may be necessary for OSH enforcement, whereas legal knowledge may be required to 
apply penalties or facilitate coordination with the judicial system. Accordingly, some 
inspectorates favor engineers, doctors, or lawyers (Asrawi, 2010; Bensusán, 2009; ILO, 2006). 
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Table 1. Recent International Labour Organization Audit and Need-Assessment Findings on 
Human Resource Issues 
Country 
Year 
Studied 
College 
Degree 
Required?a 
Technical 
Degree 
Required? 
Initial 
Training 
Provided? 
Ongoing 
Training 
Provided? 
Compensation 
Level 
Well-
Defined 
Career 
Path? 
Angola  2013 No  Yes As needed   
Botswana  2013     Low Limited 
Cambodia  2013  No  Donors   
Ethiopia  2009   Weak Weak Low  
Indonesia  2010 Yes  Yes    
Kenyab 2011 Yes For OSH Minimal    
Lesotho  2009    Donorsc  Limited 
Malawi  2009    Donors Low Limited 
Namibia  2013     Low Limited 
Nepal  2013  No No   No 
Sri Lanka  2013 Yes  No No Low Limited 
Tanzania        
Mainland  2010 Yes No No No  Some 
Zanzibar  2010 No No No No Low No 
Uganda  2013 Yes, new   Occasional Low Limited 
Vietnam  2013 Yes  3 years of 
courses 
At least 
1 week 
30%>civil 
service 
 
Zambia  2009 Yes, new    Low Limited 
SOURCE: ILO, 2013. 
a Refers to undergraduate, or bachelor’s, degree. 
b No labor inspectors hired since 1993. 
c Donors indicates that training occurred only if international donors provided it. 
 
In Table 1, we identify whether the ILO’s country profiles on labor inspection provide 
information about the topic headings. A blank cell indicates that we were unable to find clear 
information on that topic in those documents. 
Some of the educational requirements for inspectors appear to have been upgraded recently. 
For example, in 1998, McGuinness reported that the minimum requirements for obtaining a 
Mexican labor inspector position were a junior high school education and an interest in the 
subject areas related to the profession. By 2008, Bensusán observed that more than half of 
Mexican inspectors in 2007 had degrees in engineering or law, although the inspectors were not 
being paid according to their education levels.  
Von Richthofen (2002), who authored a major ILO document on labor inspection practices, 
stressed the importance of noncognitive qualifications in evaluating job candidates for labor 
inspectorates. He highlights motivation, self-reliance, and “ability to combine firmness with 
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diplomacy” in particular. The ILO reports that some developing countries have established 
noneducational job requirements for inspectors. However, the explicit requirements noted by the 
ILO focus less on personality traits, such as self-reliance, than on physical and mental health 
(ILO, 2006). 
A broader issue tied to entry requirements for new inspectors, as well as the need for 
inspector training, is the level of inspector specialization. ILO documents discuss specialization 
at two levels. The most common usage is to distinguish between systems in which a single 
enforcement officer is responsible for all labor regulations and systems that handle health and 
safety enforcement separately from wage and hour enforcement, collective bargaining, and other 
legal requirements. Second, within workplace safety and health, there are distinctions between 
inspectors who cover both and inspectors who specialize in either safety or health. On both 
levels, inspectorates may face a trade-off between breadth and depth of expertise. Inspectors who 
are responsible for the full range of labor regulations—generalists in the first, more widely used 
sense—may have less technical expertise in safety and health. Inspectors who are simultaneously 
responsible for safety and health regulations but not other labor laws—generalists in the second, 
narrower sense—may have less technical expertise in health and industrial hygiene. 
Our literature review found no empirical analysis on the relative merits of specialists or 
generalists. This is likely to reflect a fundamental identification problem: The division of 
enforcement responsibilities across inspectors almost never varies within countries over time, 
making it impossible to isolate the impact of specialization from effects of other fixed or slow-
moving factors that vary across countries, such as overall governance, labor relations, or culture. 
In our review of official documents from the ILO, we did find advocates for both types of 
inspectors. Advocates for specialists were more common in the early 1990s (Derrien, Xirau, and 
Cano, 1993), but, for most of the past 20 years, the ILO literature has shown a preference for 
generalists. In their argument for specialists, Derrien and colleagues noted that generalists would 
lack substantive knowledge to perform inspections and that it would be better to hire technical 
people and give them legal training than to give technical training to nontechnical people. The 
main counterargument is that “one of the most costly aspects of an inspectorate is getting the 
inspector to the front door of an enterprise” (von Richthofen, 2002, p. 102). Once the inspector is 
on site, it makes sense that he or she review compliance with all requirements, especially 
because workplaces will probably not be reinspected very frequently. 
Piore and Schrank (2008) present another argument for generalist inspectors. They point out 
that, when different inspectors come from different agencies, each inspector focuses only on the 
violations of his or her program, without regard to other issues at the site. In fact, however, firms 
might have many problems and might not be able to address them all, at least not at the same 
time. A generalist inspector is in a better position to weigh the competing priorities of different 
issues. However, Piore and Schrank also note that inspectors have great discretion under this 
approach, which makes it more difficult to figure out how to assess their performance. 
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Another issue that should be relevant to the discussion of generalist inspectors is whether 
there is a positive relationship between safety problems and noncompliance with other labor 
standards. This may vary across countries and over time with labor market conditions and the 
production technology in use, so it may not be possible to provide general guidance on these 
grounds. In developed societies, the apparel industry, for example, is likely to have a relatively 
difficult time complying with minimum-wage rules but might have low fatality rates and pose 
less severe safety risks than heavy manufacturing does. For that reason, employing inspectors 
who could look at both types of problems might not add much value to inspections in that 
industry. 
Labor inspectors in Mexico are generalists responsible for the application of all regulations 
within the labor code.1 Piore (2004) mentions that Mexican inspectors not only have ample 
discretion to apply regulations but also, because many are engineers with experience in a variety 
of sectors, they can work with businesses to aid them in complying with regulations. However, 
the role of virtual consultant can “easily become a cover for willful violations, for outright 
corruption or, essentially a subsidy for underinvestment and inefficient management” (Piore, 
2004, p. 13). 
Initial and Ongoing Training 
The ILO places heavy emphasis on formal training for labor inspectors: “Training will 
probably be the single most important tool at the disposal of labour inspection managers to 
improve the performance of their inspectors and support staff and, in consequence, that of their 
organization” (von Richthofen, 2002, p. 109). Drawing on practices in successful inspectorates in 
western Europe and the United States, the ILO’s guide to labor inspection urges inspectorates to 
adopt “a clear and comprehensive training policy” (von Richthofen, 2002, p. 110). But, in fact, 
there is little evidence about the relative importance of training versus incentives and other 
management tools for making inspectors successful in their work. 
The ILO’s description of best practices regarding training provides useful context for 
understanding the shortcomings they identify in many developing-country settings. Both initial 
training and ongoing training contribute to a variety of goals. Initial training is necessary to 
ensure that inspectors understand the law, to impart prevention techniques, to help inspectors 
understand the behavior and organization of the workplaces they will inspect, to enable 
inspectors to recognize OSH and other employment law violations, and to provide inspectors 
with the practical bureaucratic knowledge necessary to impose sanctions or initiate legal 
proceedings. In addition to these specialized forms of knowledge, the ILO advocates initial 
training as a way to help inspectors build important noncognitive skills related to persuasion and 
                                                
1 A reviewer pointed out that it is difficult to generalize about Mexico, which has a federal system with multiple 
agencies responsible for inspection in different places. Also, there is a degree of specialization in the federal 
inspectorate. 
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conflict management. Furthermore, initial training can serve to improve motivation and inculcate 
a professional identity among the inspectors.  
The ILO also emphasizes a systematic approach to ongoing training as a best practice. In 
successful systems, the labor inspectorate may provide official update training to reflect changes 
in the legal environment or new technology. Ongoing training would be facilitated by providing 
payment for training time. 
As Table 1 indicates, ongoing training is often conspicuously absent in developing countries. 
Some countries, such as Papua New Guinea, have no systematic training at all. In the poorest 
countries, training often occurs only in response to specific programs funded by donors outside 
the country. Other systems provide initial training but do not tailor the training to labor 
inspections; these systems offer a general introduction for all civil servants, which is unlikely to 
help inspectors learn how to meet the specific demands of their profession. Some audits, such as 
the one for Ethiopia, highlighted a dire need for training in legal procedures and interpersonal 
skills (especially conflict management). The ILO audits do not report many instances of 
comprehensive training policies that combine both initial and ongoing training (ILO, 2006). 
Exceptions include the Dominican Republic, which reportedly has a major training program 
(Schrank, 2013), and Brazil, where there is a tailored six-week curriculum followed by an 
explicit mentoring process with more-experienced inspectors. A strong inspectors’ union in 
Brazil has helped to establish a training institute that provides continuing training in addition to 
the initial training (ILO, 2010a). Vietnam also reports a more extensive training effort than most 
developing countries provide. 
Turnover, Staffing Levels, and Work Conditions 
The ILO has identified high turnover as an almost universal problem for developing-country 
inspectorates. Its reports commonly cite similar factors as causes of high turnover. In some 
countries (e.g., Bolivia [Ruiz, 2009]), low base salaries and intermittent work lead inspectors to 
take second jobs. In addition to low base pay, insufficient salary growth over time and the lack of 
opportunities for advancement within the inspectorate can lead to high attrition. Inspectors with 
higher educational attainment may be more difficult to retain because their alternatives will 
generally pay more (e.g., Ethiopia [ILO, 2009]). 
A related concern for inspector turnover is low staffing levels. Measured by the ratio of 
inspectors to workers, the ILO reports staffing levels between 50 and 250 inspectors per million 
workers in selected western and northern European countries. This sort of measurement exercise 
is inherently difficult because the available data often include support staff members who do not 
conduct inspections. An informative cross-country comparison of staffing ratios would also 
require accounting for which workers are covered by labor law; agricultural workers and those in 
the informal sector often are not. Even with those caveats in mind, the available data make it 
clear that staffing levels in some developing countries have been substantially lower than in 
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developed countries. Ethiopia had roughly four inspectors per million workers in 2009, while 
Ecuador had about six inspectors per million workers in 2005. The ILO reports staffing ratios 
between ten and 80 inspectors per million workers in most developing Latin American countries 
as of 2007 (Ruiz, 2009). 
Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2012) examined how the level of staffing in districts in South 
Africa affected compliance with minimum-wage laws and found no impact. In contrast, Ronconi 
(2010) used a panel study and found that the number of labor inspectors per capita across 
Argentina’s states did increase compliance with wage and hour legislation there. 
In addition to low staffing, one widely noted shortcoming of developing-country 
inspectorates is a severe lack of adequate facilities, office supplies, and other resources required 
to carry out inspections. The ILO reports that inspectors’ productivity in some countries is 
hampered by insufficient access to office space, paper, stationery, furniture, electricity, and even 
running water. These include Benin, Mali, Mauritania, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Guatemala, and 
Peru (ILO, 2006). Insufficient travel resources are cited for many developing countries as a 
serious concern. Some nationwide inspection forces have only a single official vehicle (e.g., 
Burundi and Peru) or may be unable to keep vehicles in working condition (e.g., Philippines and 
Costa Rica). In other systems, inspectors are expected to rely on public transport and do not have 
a reliable travel budget (ILO, 2010b). Surprisingly, the ILO reports insufficient provision of 
these basic job resources in middle-income Latin American and southeast Asian countries (e.g., 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, and the Philippines) and not just in low-income 
African countries (e.g., Benin and Mali). Although these are not HR problems in and of 
themselves, they seem noteworthy here because it seems likely that inadequate job resources 
undermine morale and exacerbate turnover problems: For Uganda, the ILO reports that staff 
frustration with insufficient human and financial resources was the primary reason for high 
turnover (ILO, 2010b). 
Several Latin American countries—including Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, 
and El Salvador—have made substantial reforms to reduce turnover by establishing a more 
explicit career path for inspectors (Ruiz, 2009). Costa Rica has introduced incentive-based pay to 
increase labor inspectors’ salaries above pay levels in the general civil service. The ILO and 
others have identified Brazil and the Dominican Republic as countries where good pay and long-
term career opportunities have helped build successful inspectorates (Pires, 2010; ILO, 2010a). 
Measuring and Incentivizing Labor Inspector Performance 
Designing methods to assess the performance of labor inspectors has been an ongoing 
challenge to the field. The International Association of Labour Inspection (IALI) recently 
published a book (Tosine and Wedege, 2013) examining some of the options, but most of these 
require the kind of data systems that only developed societies are likely to have. 
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Attempts to measure performance in any way other than the number of inspections conducted 
are rare in developing countries. Using number of inspections as a performance metric, some 
nations have implemented pay-for-performance policies to monitor and incentivize inspector 
performance. For example, prior to 2008, some regional inspectorates in Brazil based 
compensation on the number of inspections performed or on the amount of unpaid taxes 
collected. However, the ILO has voiced concern that performance incentives in Argentina and 
Brazil had distorted the targeting of inspections. Specifically, Pires (2010) argues that inspectors 
working in pay-for-performance systems focused narrowly on their performance measures yet 
were outperformed by small teams that were exempted from the performance measures and 
allowed to design their own approaches. Civil service reforms in 2008 eliminated bonuses based 
on individual productivity (ILO, 2010a). A more distal, but perhaps meaningful, measure of 
inspector performance relates to the effects of inspections at the inspected establishments (i.e., 
specific deterrence) and the effects on those that are not inspected (i.e., general deterrence). 
However, linking the measures of effects to individual inspector performance is difficult.2 It 
requires a large number of inspections by each inspector (i.e., large sample size), as well as data 
on other characteristics that may affect the impact of inspections. 
Although ILO audits criticize the use of explicit performance targets in Latin America, audits 
in other regions suggest that such targets may be helpful in other settings. For example, an 
evaluation of Ethiopia’s inspectorate noted huge disparities across offices in the number of 
inspections carried out per inspector per month, prompting the ILO to recommend the 
establishment of explicit performance targets. 
Because of the difficulties of using injury rates, more-developed societies have turned to 
output and process measures, such as the number of serious violations cited or the number of 
employer appeals. 
Other fields of labor inspection often have more-straightforward measures. These have 
included the amounts of back wages paid to employees and, for child labor programs, the 
number of children removed from unacceptable work. 
The disappointing outcomes of incentive pay for inspectors in Brazil may reflect a larger 
difficulty with pay-for-performance systems: Incentives based on narrow performance measures 
will be counterproductive if measured performance is improved by reducing effort exerted on 
unmeasured aspects of the job. The more complex the task is, the more difficult it can be to 
define any adequate proxy for performance that eliminates incentives to shirk on the unmeasured 
tasks. Labor inspection might be sufficiently complex that no effective incentive pay system 
could ever be constructed. 
As an alternative to monetary incentives for inspector performance, teamwork may act as a 
performance incentive. For example, Pires (2010) attempts to compare the effectiveness of two 
                                                
2 This is because of the difficulty of establishing what would have happened in the absence of the inspection, 
especially at workplaces with only a few injuries. 
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approaches to labor inspection used in Brazil. The first he describes as the standard pattern, in 
which the chief incentive provided to inspectors is meeting the goal for the number of 
inspections they conduct. He contrasts this with a series of initiatives related to several different 
labor laws, in which small teams of inspectors were created and encouraged to be more creative. 
One path they took was to reach out to other organizations whose data and resources could be 
useful for helping them to improve their ability to find noncompliance. Pires acknowledges, 
however, that these special efforts may not help an agency address the day-to-day needs to 
respond to workers’ complaints or to emergencies. As a result, he suggests that both types of 
activities are needed. 
A long-time Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) official in the United 
States agreed that inspectors often looked forward to team approaches that allowed them to be 
more inventive and more social. However, OSHA’s own experience in trying to reinvent its area 
offices in the 1990s provides an example of an approach that was not sustainable. A study of that 
experience by Simon and Sparrow (1997) reported that inspectors were told to work together to 
solve problems rather than to focus on the number of inspections. However, they sometimes 
found it difficult to figure out what that meant they should do. Meanwhile, the number of 
inspections plummeted, and opposition to the program quickly mounted until it was abandoned. 
One factor that may affect inspector performance is work experience. Evidence from two 
studies in the United States indicates that greater experience leads to better outcomes of safety 
and health inspections—measured by the changes in injury rates at the inspected establishments. 
Controlling for other factors associated with inspection outcomes and limiting the sample to 
inspectors with more than a minimum number of inspections, both studies found that injury rates 
after inspection fell more when more-experienced inspectors were involved. The study by Guo 
(1999) examined OSHA inspectors, and the study by Haviland et al. (2012) examined California 
Division of Occupational Safety and Health inspectors. 
Inspectorate Culture and Ethical Behavior 
An important facet of job performance is counterproductive work behavior (CWB), which is 
intentional behavior enacted by a member of the organization that is viewed as “contrary to [the 
organization’s] legitimate interests” (Sackett and DeVore, 2001, p. 145). Counterproductive 
behaviors include corruption and other forms of dishonesty in the workplace. Predictors of 
CWBs are multifaceted, with organizational and national context interacting in complex ways to 
influence such CWBs as corruption. For example, Martin et al. (2007) studied bribery risk in 
local firms in 38 countries and showed that individualist countries tended to have higher bribery 
levels, but countries that spend more on social-welfare programs and have legitimate institutions 
to impose regulations tended to have lower bribery activity. At the organizational level, 
perceived intensity of competition with other organizations and perceptions of financial 
constraints also related to increased bribery activity. Although this study does not apply to labor 
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inspectors specifically, the findings suggest that some factors, such as legitimacy of 
institutions—a problem for many developing nations—can be important predictors of bribery. 
Given the incentive to hide corrupt behavior by those who practice it and the difficulties that 
the ILO audit teams face in raising issues of corruption with the agencies that they are trying to 
assist, not much hard evidence about corrupt behavior by labor inspectors is presented in the 
writings of academics or of the ILO. An exception was Ruthven’s (2010) study of enforcement 
in Moradabad, India, which found widespread corruption. Inspectors’ discretion about which 
worksites to inspect increased their ability to collect from employers, even ones they did not 
inspect. Ruthven also reports that it is administratively costly to challenge an inspector’s report 
and to discipline an inspector. To the extent that the workforce believes in the mission of the 
agency, the inspectors should be less likely to engage in counterproductive behaviors, such as 
extortion. Also, the less discretion that inspectors exercise, the less able they are to provide 
anything of value to potential bribers. 
Relationship Between Enforcement and Human Resource Issues 
Although our study does not directly address enforcement strategies, it is important to note 
that different strategies can have important implications for HR. In her studies of environmental 
inspections in the United Kingdom, Hutter (1989) emphasized the importance of the relation 
between the enforcement official and the regulated entity. In particular, she cited “relational 
distance,” the greater difficulty in adopting a tough stance toward the regulated the closer one is 
to that community. Shover, Clelland, and Lynxwiler (1982) found that surface mining inspectors 
in the United States with lengthy assignments to single mines were less likely to demand 
stringent enforcement. Similarly, a study of offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico 
(Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen, 2013) found that length of time at an assignment was linked 
to laxer enforcement. It also found that adding members to an inspection team increased 
stringency. Although empirical studies of this issue in poor countries are not available, von 
Richthofen (2002) also suggested that inspectors should not be kept in the same industry sector 
for long periods because they “tend to have an insufficiently critical and questioning attitude to 
long-established practices” (p. 160). 
It also seems very likely that more-adversarial inspection strategies increase the 
psychological strain on inspectors, at least compared with a system that relies more on 
persuasion and information. However, if stringency is required, inspectors may take refuge in 
“going by the book” (Bardach and Kagan, 1982). An insistence that “my hands are tied” may 
help to insulate an inspector from a worksite’s efforts to apply pressure. Hutter (1989) makes the 
further point that, for “persuasion” to be an effective strategy, it is probably necessary that there 
be opportunities for at least several interactions to occur. Persuasion and education can require 
time, and the inspector needs to be able to follow up to ensure that the worksite is not simply 
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being evasive. Therefore, if strict enforcement is not the only or even the major goal, the 
admonition to avoid long-term relationships may not be compelling. 
Schrank (2013) describes efforts in the Dominican Republic to make labor inspection more 
professional and less adversarial. Beginning in the 1990s, the government tripled inspector pay, 
recruited law-school graduates, used a competitive examination, instituted merit promotions, 
enhanced job security, and established a career ladder within the inspectorate. Meanwhile, 
inspectors became flexible and pragmatic in their approach to enforcement, emphasizing 
prevention over punitive measures. The inspectors describe themselves as “pedagogical agents” 
tasked with helping employers develop compliance plans. Schrank argues that flexibility and a 
collaborative mind-set reduce the economic burden of enforcement and improve stakeholder 
satisfaction and compliance.  
Von Richthofen (2002) also recommends that inspectors provide advice to employers, rather 
than simply acting as police; however, because they need to be efficient in reaching the optimal 
number of worksites, inspectors needed to stop short of acting as consultants. The relative merits 
of more-adversarial or more-collaborative approaches are beyond the scope of our focus on HR 
issues. Given the absence of information about changes in compliance associated with different 
approaches, it is difficult to assess those approaches. 
Limitations 
The paucity of analytical studies of labor inspectorates, especially in developing countries, 
makes it difficult to draw lessons about the impact of HR practices on the inspectorates’ work. 
As a result, part of our review is descriptive. The paucity of literature also limited the number 
of topics we discuss in our review. Although we organized the literature search using three 
categories of factors that could affect labor inspector effectiveness, we do not organize the report 
according to these three categories. Instead, we identified themes with enough material using our 
codes of study and report features. We derive these codes from the three categories of factors 
related to labor inspector effectiveness. 
In addition to the limited scholarly work, the descriptive material from the ILO and other 
reports suffers from limitations. Data on inspectorates in poor countries are often difficult to 
obtain. Changes in inspectorate policies and practices sometimes occur rapidly. Therefore, the 
descriptive material reported here might not be current or accurate, even if it we base it on data 
collected in the past few years. 
A final limitation is that we reviewed literature in only English and Spanish. Studies written 
in other languages may provide information on HR-relevant practices for labor inspectors that 
we do not discuss in this report. 
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Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to try to identify the conditions, competencies, and incentives 
needed for labor inspectors to carry out their work effectively, especially in developing 
countries. Unfortunately, few studies on labor inspections in developing countries went beyond 
simple description. Even description was quite limited because there was often little or no 
information available about the characteristics of inspections and their results. Despite the 
paucity of studies and the limited measures available, we offer several suggestions based on the 
review. 
One concerns the debate about specialist versus generalist inspectors. The argument for 
generalists seems strongest in the poorest countries. In those countries, technical knowledge is 
rare, and transportation difficulties are likely to loom especially large. Even for middle-income 
countries, we point out that the choice should depend as well on the likely overlap of OSH 
hazards and other labor standard violations. Some of the ILO descriptions of labor inspectorates 
indicate, however, that the roles are often specialized and that there are bureaucratic obstacles to 
combining them. 
We also relied on audits of labor inspectorates conducted by the ILO to provide a rough 
description of some HR practices. Creating a taxonomy and filling in the boxes is a small, but 
useful, step in developing a database that could be used to carry out more-careful studies of both 
changes over time and differences among countries. 
The finding about the beneficial role of experience for OSH inspectors in the United States 
may apply to poor countries. However, studies in developing countries and outside the OSH 
context would be needed to validate the finding outside the United States. 
Although keeping an inspector in one location for long periods improves the information that 
the inspector has, doing so might also make rigorous enforcement of regulations more difficult. 
On the other hand, an inspector’s familiarity with the operation and his or her ability to develop a 
longer-term relationship might foster a more collaborative approach to oversight. 
Are there insights for ILAB into the role that it might play to help labor inspectorates in 
developing countries? Part of ILAB’s role is to foster research. Given the weak state of data 
systems in very poor countries, we think that the most useful research for such countries is 
qualitative—describing what inspectors actually do and why. For middle-income countries that 
have been improving their data systems, ILAB could aid those efforts so that researchers could 
use them to better understand, at least, the relationship between inspection activities and output 
measures (e.g., hazards detected, violations cited, back wages paid, children removed from 
illegal conditions). 
More broadly, efforts to improve labor inspection will probably proceed apace with broader 
efforts to improve the quality of the civil service in developing countries. Therefore, ILAB 
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should attempt to participate in those efforts to take advantage of ideas with applicability to labor 
inspection. 
Appendix: Databases and Search Terms 
Table 2. Searches Conducted for This Study 
Source Search Terms Results 
SCOPUSa, b, c TITLE-ABS-KEY(“labor inspector*” OR “compliance officer*” OR “labor officer*” OR 
“fishery officer*” OR “safety inspector*” OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery 
inspector*” OR “health inspector*” OR (TITLE-ABS-KEY “labor law*” OR “Labor 
regulat*” OR “Labor standard*” AND TITLE-ABS-KEY enforce*) OR “industrial 
hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*”) 
AND 
TITLE-ABS-KEY(Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR 
experience* OR supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” 
OR maturity OR recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff 
OR staffing OR certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR 
“professional development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability 
OR competency OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity 
OR productive OR conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor 
conduct” OR negligent OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR 
steal OR stealing OR stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR 
retain OR separation OR separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR 
retire OR retirement OR absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR 
“sick leave” OR “sick time” OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR 
bureau* OR manag* OR flexibility OR discretion) 
AND 
TITLE-ABS-KEY(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR 
damage OR destruction OR (TITLE-ABS-KEY property AND TITLE-ABS-KEY 
Loss) OR compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab* OR (TITLE-
ABS-KEY risk AND TITLE-ABS-KEY injury)) 
564 
Web of 
Sciencea, b, c 
(TS=(“labor inspector*” OR “compliance officer*” OR “labor officer*” OR “fishery 
officer*” OR “safety inspector*” OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery inspector*” 
OR “health inspector*” OR “industrial hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*”)) OR 
(TS=(“labor law*” OR “Labor regulat*” OR “Labor standard*”) AND TS=(enforce*)) 
AND 
TS=(Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR experience* OR 
supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” OR maturity OR 
recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff OR staffing OR 
certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR “professional 
development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability OR competency 
OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity OR productive OR 
conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor conduct” OR negligent 
OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR steal OR stealing OR 
stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR retain OR separation OR 
separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR retire OR retirement OR 
absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR “sick leave” OR “sick time” 
OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR bureau* OR manag* OR 
flexibility OR discretion) 
AND 
TS=(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR damage OR 
destruction OR  compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab*) OR 
(TS=(property) AND TS=(loss)) OR (TS=(risk) AND TS=(injury)) 
166 – 
97 duplicates = 
69 
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Source Search Terms Results 
Sociological 
Abstractsa, b, c, d 
(“labor inspector*” OR “compliance officer*” OR “labor officer*” OR “fishery officer*” 
OR “safety inspector*” OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery inspector*” OR 
“health inspector*” OR “industrial hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*” OR ((labor 
law*” OR “Labor regulat*” OR “Labor standard*”) AND enforce*)) 
AND 
Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR experience* OR 
supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” OR maturity OR 
recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff OR staffing OR 
certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR “professional 
development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability OR competency 
OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity OR productive OR 
conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor conduct” OR negligent 
OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR steal OR stealing OR 
stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR retain OR separation OR 
separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR retire OR retirement OR 
absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR “sick leave” OR “sick time” 
OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR bureau* OR manag* OR 
flexibility OR discretion 
AND 
(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR damage OR 
destruction OR  compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab* OR 
(property AND loss) OR (risk AND injury)) 
30 – 
7 duplicates = 
23 
PsycInfoa, d, e, f (“labor inspector*” OR “compliance officer*” OR “labor officer*” OR “fishery officer*” 
OR “safety inspector*” OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery inspector*” OR 
“health inspector*” OR “industrial hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*” OR ((labor 
law*” OR “Labor regulat*” OR “Labor standard*”) AND enforce*)) 
AND 
Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR experience* OR 
supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” OR maturity OR 
recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff OR staffing OR 
certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR “professional 
development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability OR competency 
OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity OR productive OR 
conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor conduct” OR negligent 
OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR steal OR stealing OR 
stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR retain OR separation OR 
separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR retire OR retirement OR 
absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR “sick leave” OR “sick time” 
OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR bureau* OR manag* OR 
flexibility OR discretion 
AND 
(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR damage OR 
destruction OR  compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab* OR 
(property AND loss) OR (risk AND injury)) 
33 – 
12 duplicates = 
21 
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Source Search Terms Results 
Social Science 
Abstractsa, e, f, g 
(“labor inspector*” OR “compliance officer*” OR “labor officer*” OR “fishery officer*” 
OR “safety inspector*” OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery inspector*” OR 
“health inspector*” OR “industrial hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*” OR ((labor 
law*” OR “Labor regulat*” OR “Labor standard*”) AND enforce*)) 
AND 
Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR experience* OR 
supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” OR maturity OR 
recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff OR staffing OR 
certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR “professional 
development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability OR competency 
OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity OR productive OR 
conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor conduct” OR negligent 
OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR steal OR stealing OR 
stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR retain OR separation OR 
separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR retire OR retirement OR 
absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR “sick leave” OR “sick time” 
OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR bureau* OR manag* OR 
flexibility OR discretion 
AND 
(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR damage OR 
destruction OR  compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab* OR 
(property AND loss) OR (risk AND injury)) 
43 – 
4 duplicates = 
39 
Business 
Source 
Completea, b, d, f, 
i 
(“labor inspector*” OR “labor officer*” OR “fishery officer*” OR “safety inspector*” 
OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery inspector*” OR “health inspector*” OR 
“industrial hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*” OR ((labor law*” OR “Labor 
regulat*” OR “Labor standard*”) AND enforce*)) 
AND 
Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR experience* OR 
supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” OR maturity OR 
recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff OR staffing OR 
certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR “professional 
development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability OR competency 
OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity OR productive OR 
conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor conduct” OR negligent 
OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR steal OR stealing OR 
stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR retain OR separation OR 
separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR retire OR retirement OR 
absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR “sick leave” OR “sick time” 
OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR bureau* OR manag* OR 
flexibility OR discretion 
AND 
(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR damage OR 
destruction OR  compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab* OR 
(property AND loss) OR (risk AND injury)) 
542 – 
27 duplicates = 
515 
 17 
Source Search Terms Results 
EconLita, e, f, h (“labor inspector*” OR “compliance officer*” OR “labor officer*” OR “fishery officer*” 
OR “safety inspector*” OR “compliance inspector*” OR “fishery inspector*” OR 
“health inspector*” OR “industrial hygienist” OR “agricultural inspector*” OR ((labor 
law*” OR “Labor regulat*” OR “Labor standard*”) AND enforce*)) 
AND 
Corrupt* OR competen* OR training OR personality OR experience* OR 
supervision OR education OR skill* OR “emotional intelligence” OR maturity OR 
recruit* OR outreach OR applicant* OR hiring OR hire OR staff OR staffing OR 
certification OR course OR courses OR coursework OR “professional 
development” OR mentor OR mentoring OR knowledge OR ability OR competency 
OR capability OR competence OR performance OR productivity OR productive OR 
conduct OR incompetence OR “poor behavior” OR “poor conduct” OR negligent 
OR negligence OR bribe OR bribery OR graft OR theft OR steal OR stealing OR 
stolen OR crime OR criminal OR illegal OR retention OR retain OR separation OR 
separate OR turnover OR attrition OR withdrawal OR retire OR retirement OR 
absentee OR absenteeism OR tardy OR tardiness OR “sick leave” OR “sick time” 
OR incentive* OR compensation OR compensate* OR bureau* OR manag* OR 
flexibility OR discretion 
AND 
(effectiveness OR impact OR safety OR hazard* OR health OR damage OR 
destruction OR  compliance OR quality OR performance OR accountab* OR 
(property AND loss) OR (risk AND injury)) 
100 – 
17 duplicates = 
83 
a Years searched: 1993 to 2013. 
b Languages searched: English, Spanish, and Chinese. 
c Date searched: October 10, 2013. 
d Publication type: all (includes dissertations). 
e Language searched: English. 
f Date searched: October 11, 2013. 
g Publication type: all (includes journals, periodicals [trade], and news). 
h Publication type: all. 
i We had to take out “compliance officer*” in this search; it was retrieving thousands of banking and financial-industry 
results. 
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